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Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I am deeply 
honored to represent the more than 5,000 dedi- 
cated young men and women who serve human- 
ity as pilots and aircrewmen in the United States 
Coast Guard. I’d like to spend the next thirty 
minutes telling their story by borrowing on my 
own experiences. I hope to be able to entertain 
and inform you. I don’t have a heavy message 
to impart, but I’ll close my talk with a few per- 
sonal observations which do not necessarily repre- 
sent the official views of the United States Coast 
Guard. 
Before I begin, let me acquaint you with a few 
facts about my uniform, which will help you to 
enjoy one of my “sea stories”. I wear the naval 
aviator’s “wings of gold”, as do all Coast Guard 
pilots, regardless of their source of training. I also 
own a bunch of service ribbons, or what we call 
“gedunk” ribbons (expert rifle and pistol, “I was 
alive in ’65”, unit commendations, and so forth). 
I’ve never been to a shooting war. I suppose the 
only enemy I’ve ever confronted in aviation was 
weather. I have, on two occasions, been the recip- 
ient of the Air Medal for “meritorious achievement 
in aerial flight” in action against the weather en- 
emy. In retrospect, I’m not sure the Coast Guard 
should decorate those who have tilted at such wind- 
mills. We may be encouraging a “Deer Hunter” 
mentality among these airmen. 
I’ll have to admit that I’m very nervous, surrounded 
by such an awesome assemblage of scientists, avi- 
ation industry representatives, and managers of 
the National Airspace System Plan. I’ve literally 
wracked by brain for a good weather joke to use 
as an “icebreaker”, but I came up empty-handed. 
Instead, I thought maybe I’d relate an incident 
which occurred several years ago up in Alaska. It’s 
a true story, there’s a moral, and I can laugh about 
it. ..now. 
Once upon a lonely mid-winter night, a U. S .  fish- 
ing vessel broadcast a MAYDAY, reporting a steer- 
ing casualty which seemed to indicate that within 
a few hours the boat would be driven onto the 
north shore of Unimak Island by an intense Aleu- 
tian storm. A C-130 aircraft, piloted by a close 
friend of mine, quickly departed from USCG Air 
Station Kodiak to locate the distressedvessel, stand 
ready to airdrop survival equipment, and act as a 
“pathfinder” for my helicopter. 
My eo-pilot and I carefully planned the 450-mile 
non-stop flight from Kodiak to the scene, silently 
thankful that the well-equipped airport at Cold 
Bay was within 50 miles of the vessel and would 
be our ultimate destination. Weather conditions 
and darkness combined to paint a bleak picture. 
After takeoff from the tiny haven of our base, the 
HH-3F seemed to be swallowed up by the forces 
of nature; we were in the belly of the whale. Our 
route of flight took us south of the Aleutian chain, 
island-hopping from Kodiak to the Trinities, past 
the Semidis to the Shumagins at altitudes below 
1,000 feet to avoid airframe ice. A strong, north- 
west gusting wind produced moderate and occa- 
sionally severe turbulence. Eye fatigue encoun- 
tered in scanning the flight and engine instruments 
prevented either of us from flying for more than 
a half hour at a time. Snow showers filled our 
radar scope and occasionally obliterated echoes 
from nearby land masses. A ninety-mile open ocean 
leg of our trackline required DR navigation, since 
LORAN A coverage of the area was inherently 
poor. It seemed like an eternity before we acquired 
those islands on radar. 
After about two hours, I became intrigued by oc- 
casional glimpses of moonlight and stars through 
“holes” in the overcast. My curiosity overwhelmed 
me, and I asked my buddy in the “herk” what type 
of flight conditions he was experiencing upstairs. 
He said he had brbken out at 6,000 feet into “VFR 
on top”, and had established an orbit over the dis- 
tressed vessel at 10,000 feet. 
I felt certain that we could esczpe the incessant 
jolting by mechanical turbulence if it were possible 
to climb above the “lee” of the Aleutian terrain. 
The C-130 obtained our clearance from Anchor- 
age Center, and with the appearance of another 
“hole”, we started to climb. 
The next few minutes were rather spooky. Both 
engine anti-ice caution lights illuminated, an indi- 
cation that the systems which served to heat the 
air intake path were being thwarted by the minus 
20 degree Celsius outside air temperature. Biting 
my lip as we passed 4,000 feet, I tried to take some 
consolation from the fact that the low temperature 
should prevent ice accretion. The fragility of our 
situation dawned on me with another rush of re- 
alization that we were hundreds of miles from an 
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airport served by navigational or approach aids, 
thousands of feet above a hostile ocean, dodging 
turbulence and icing, at night, in, quite parenthet- 
ically, a helicopter. 
Now, I think we all recognize that helicopters have 
come a long way since their inception as a col- 
lection of aircraft parts flying in close formation. 
The pilots who fly these machines are, however, 
to quote ABC news commentator Harry Reasoner, 
“brooding introverts, anticipators of trouble who 
know that if something bad has not happeued yet, 
it is just about to.” They even & in a weird man- 
ner, all hunched over the controls and squinting in 
the last great act of defiance. My evening prayers 
used to include Sikorsky Aircraft, General Elec- 
tric, and Collins Radio. It’s always been hard to 
accept the fact that the company whose engines 
kept me aloft for nearly 4,000 hours could also 
burn my toast in the morning. 
As we topped the overcast and continued the climb 
to 8,000 feet, a sudden brilliant flash of light re- 
flected off of the left side of the aircraft and into 
the cockpit. My eyes shot toward the engine in- 
struments and I asked the flight mechanic to view 
the exterior for signs of a fire. I became totally 
confused as our troubleshooting began to rule out 
problems with the aircraft. The flashes of light 
seemed to be originating within the atmosphere to 
the west of us. Lightning was an almost unheard 
of phenomenon in Alaska, particularly in win.ter, 
and we had never seriously considered it. 
At about this time, my buddy in the C-130 called 
and asked if we were enjoying the show. It turned 
out that, in a weird coincidence, a dormant vol- 
cano on Unimak Island had begun to erupt that 
night, sending a huge cloud of hot gases over thirty 
thousand feet into the super cold Alaskan sky. The 
resulting “light show”, featuring lightning cloud- 
to-cloud, was spectacular; I have never forgiven 
my friend for his failure to forewarn me. 
I guess I’ll have to finish this tale, or you will be 
forced to conclude that we never made it. As we 
endured a quartering headwind and approached 
Unimak Island from the east-southeast, the dis- 
tressed vessel’s skipper seemed to gain confidence 
by the minute. He devised a plan to back into 
the wind and sea, steering the boat with differen- 
tial power from his twin screws and maintaining a 
safe distance offshore until the arrival of a Coast 
Guard vessel at daybreak. 
For my part, I had abandoned all hope of proceed- 
ing directly to the scene without first stopping to 
refuel at Cold Bay. After four hours of bucking 
headwinds, our fuel remaining was becoming crit- 
ical. 
The Flight Service Station at Cold Bay reported 
“ceiling indefinite, sky obscured, visibility less than 
one-eighth of a mile in a blowing snow, winds 
northwest at 35 knots gusting to 50”. As we ap- 
proached Deer Island, the initial approach fix for 
the back course localizer approach to runway 32, 
my co-pilot and I discussed our options. The back 
course approach would be quicker to execute, in 
view of our fuel state, since we were conveniently 
near the IAF. In addition, our let-down to mini- 
mums would be into the wind, permitting a slower 
groundspeed as we scanned for the runway envi- 
ronment in conditions of minimum visibility. A 
significant disadvantage lie in the fact that the 
nonprecision back course minimums were several 
hundred feet higher than those prescribed for the 
ILS to the opposing runway. Even at 200 feet AGL 
at the bottom of an ILS, we were hoping for a mir- 
acle. There would be insufficient fuel for multiple 
approaches. We opted for the approach by An- 
chorage Center. 
As we approached the non-directional beacon in 
a descent to the initial approach altitude of 2,500 
feet, we re-entered the clouds and began to bounce 
around again in the wake of nearby Pavlov vol- 
cano, which rose over 8,000 feet, Turning out- 
bound over the Bering Sea, I slowed our airspeed 
to 80 knots and timed for an interminable five min- 
utes to ahticipate the awesome tailwind which we 
would acquire on the inbound course. The de- 
picted left procedure turn progressed well until 
turning to intercept the final approach course. 
My co-pilot suddenly asserted that I was flying a 
heading which would not result in the desired in- 
tercept. I stifled a mental scream of panic. While 
scanning steering information on the flight direc- 
tor and cross-checking the approach plate, I re- 
cited old adages to “turn to and through to cen- 
ter the CDI” and “the head of the needle will fall 
and the tail will rise.” My actions were defen- 
sible, and my eo-pilot conceded a perceptual er- 
ror brought on, no doubt, by terrific fatigue and 
stress. To this day, I admire him for verbally ex- 
pressing doubt about the progress of the approach, 
because a healthy skepticism in the cockpit can 
avert disaster. 
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I slowed the aircraft to 50 knots as we intercepted 
the localizer, but judged from the rate of descent 
required to remain on glide slope that our ground- 
speed would be much higher than the no-wind 
80-knot approach speeds which I had frequently 
practiced. At minimums, the co-pilot announced 
“rabbit” in sight. I looked up briefly, but did not 
feel that the sequential high-intensity lights would 
be sufficient visual reference to grope for the run- 
way in the snow. The low-fuel lights were blinking 
on in both main tanks, indicating 20 minutes of 
fuel remaining. A missed approach was out of the 
question. I dismissed earlier thoughts circling into 
the wind after “breaking out” at minimums. This 
was one of those instances where you never truly 
“break out” ... the reason why CAT I1 and CAT I11 
approaches were designed. 
I told my co-pilot to stay visual and be ready to 
take the controls while continuing to fly the local- 
izer and descending below minimums. As the he- 
licopter passed through 100 feet AGL, the co-pilot 
stated that he could see one set of runway lights 
going by at a time and could gain visual reference. 
I passed control of the aircraft to him, but stayed 
on the guages, ready to take control back in the 
event he became disoriented. I talked him down 
in IO-feet increments on the radar altimeter until 
just prior to touchdown, when something totally 
unanticipated happened. 
At about thirty feet or one-half rotor diameter 
above the ground, the helicopter enters ground ef- 
fect and begins to create a “cushion” of air, which 
is normally expelled behind the craft in an air taxi 
or running landing situation at speeds above trans- 
lational lift. In our case, a cloud of dry, powdery 
snow raced ahead of the helicopter and created a 
“white-out” situation due to the tailwind. ‘ 
I shifted my scan from the radar altimeter to my 
side window, where I could see the runway lights 
going by one at a time and talked the co-pilot 
down the final few feet to a surprisingly smooth 
running landing. You can imagine the relief we 
felt as the aircraft was braked to a stop. 
We encountered tremendous difficulty in taxiing 
toward the parking ramp, and only succeeded by 
using the lights of a cross runway to establish our 
location, and then relying on the airport diagram 
and intimate knowledge of the field to move cau- 
tiously a few hundred yards. 
A short conversation with the C-130 ensued. He 
agreed to remain overhead the distressed vessel 
until fuel state required that he depart scene for 
Kodiak. A high-frequency radio at the Flight Ser- 
vice Station would enable us to monitor the vessel 
throughout the night in case the sitution began to 
deteriorate and require us to hoist the fishermen 
from the craft. I told my buddy in the “herk” that 
only the most dire of circumstances could persuade 
me to launch from Cold Bay. I was not at all con- 
vinced we couId give a repeat performance of the 
approach and landing which had just transpired. 
At this point, my young flight mechanic, who had 
been listening to the radio conversation, piped up 
on the ICs with the most astonishing statement I 
have ever heard. He said, and I quote, “Gee, Mr. 
Smith, if you can put me over that boat before 
daybreak, I can hoist all of those people and we’ll 
all get the Distinguished Flying Cross.” I began 
laughing hysterically and could barely accomplish 
the secure checklist. I still smile inwardly at any 
mention of the DFC. 
The Coast Guard is a service steeped in tradi- 
tion. We are the oldest continuous seagoing ser- 
vice, older even than the Navy, which was dis- 
banded between the Revolutionary War and the 
War of 1812. As an amalgamation of the Revenue 
Cutter Service, the Lighthouse Service, and the 
Lifesaving Service, the Coast Guard acquired an 
unofficial motto which says, “You have to go out, 
but you don’t have to come back.” Pride, “can- 
do” attitude, mandated readiness, and a strongly 
perceived moral obligation have combined to present 
Coast Guard aviation management with an ethi- 
cal dilemma over the past few years. Should we, 
or could we, ever say no in a situation where flight 
crew is likely to be subjected to the same risks as 
those whom we have set out to rescue? Of the 
many risk factors which characterize an elevated 
aviation accident potential, weather ranks along- 
side material failure as a random occurrence which 
cannot be programmed out through training or 
testing alone. 
I would describe the average Coast, Guard avia- 
tor as a “weather-wise” individual. Experience 
has taught us that weather is our greatest adver- 
sary and that we will often be called upon to fly 
when others do not. A sharp rise in Coast Guard 
aviation’s accident fatality rate during the period 
from 1978 to and through 1981 is attributable to 
weather as a “factor”. 
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For instance, one of our accident boards surmised 
that a night offshore helicopter crash which was 
fatal to all four crewmen was induced by pilot fa- 
tigue and resuttant inadvertent tail rotor contact 
with the water during a prolonged hover over a 
distressed boat. You have to go back and ask your- 
self why the fisherman was distressed in the first 
place. Secondly, why had the pilot become a vic- 
tim of acute short-term fatigue? The cause factor 
was most certainly environmental. 
In another case, one of our single engine helicopters 
experienced an inflight engine failure during a vi- 
olent gale which lashed the Pacific Northwest sev- 
eral years ago. The pilot successfully autorotated 
the aircraft to a crash landing in mountainous 
seas. The helicopter quickly rolled inverted, but 
all three crewmen egressed into the open ocean. 
Cast apart and driven over a mile to shore by the 
breakers, two of the three miraculously survived. 
Again, little doubt exists as to the environmental 
impact on this accident, although weather did not 
cause the engine to fail. 
I would like to share with you a few of the facts sur- 
rounding a fatal aircraft accident with which I am 
intimately familiar. I was the member of a board 
which investigated the loss of an HH-3F helicopter 
210 nautical miles southeast of Otis ANGB, Cape 
Cod, on the night of 18 February 1979. A Japanese 
longliner, the Kaisei Maru 18, reported a crew- 
man suffering from head injuries and lacerations 
sustained during a fall earlier in the day. Medi- 
cal evaluation was impeded by a troublesome lan- 
guage barrier and a lack of voice communications 
with the ship. Rescue Coordination Center Boston 
received C W transmission of phraseology from the 
International Code of Signals in morse code de- 
scribing the patient’s condition. After medical 
evacuation was decided upon, the vessel’s exact 
position could not be established. Since the mis- 
sion required that the HH-3F be flown to its max- 
imum range, two aborted launches resulted from 
uncertainty over the position. 
The helicopter departed the air station at 0312 lo- 
cal time on 18 February, arriving on scene in a 
hover at 0502. At approximately 0515, while en- 
gaged in an attempt to deliver a stokes litter to the 
Kaisei Maru 18, the helicopter suffered an appar- 
ent partial power loss and was ditched alongside 
the vessel. As the aircraft’s rotor blades came in 
contact with the seas, the helicopter was wrenched 
violently into an inverted position. The hoist op- 
erator, who only moments before had been poised 
in the cabin door, was able to extricate himself 
from the aircraft and cling to the nosewheel until 
the ship pulled him aboard. The pilot, co-pilot, ra- 
dioman, and medic drowned during the attempted 
egress. 
The following weather synopsis was submitted to 
the board by Detachment 6,26th Weather Squadron, 
Pease AFB, NH: 
During the weekend of 18-19 February, a cold po- 
lar air mass was situated over New England and 
the adjacent coastal waters. High pressure cen- 
tered over Lake Huron, coupled with a low cen- 
ter situated in the Canadian Maritime Provinces, 
were producing strong northwesterly flow from the 
surface up through several thousand feet. This 
flow resulted in the advection of cold polar air from 
central Canada to several hundred miles offshore. 
The high centered over Lake Huron moved east- 
ward to northern New York State over the fol- 
lowing twelve hours. No significant intensification 
was noted. During the same time period, the low 
located in the Canadian Maritimes drifted north- 
eastward. The surface wind pattern remained es- 
sentially constant during this period, with the flow 
being from between 300 and 330 degrees. Al- 
though little weather data is available in the vicin- 
ity of the accident, the synoptic pattern suggests 
that northwest flow existed out to at least 300 NM 
offshore. 
Based on available coastal wind data, the winds 
in the vicinity of the crash site were most proba- 
bly between 25 to 40 knots, gusts included. Ev- 
idence to support this velocity can be found in 
the attached data. Nantucket light vessel reported 
winds of 320 degrees at 20 knots. Winds for the 
same time at Matinicus Rock were reported at 
30 knots. An earlier ship report in position 44- 
20N166-30W gave the wind as 360 degrees at 35 
knots. 
Coastal stations in New England were reporting 
clear skies. However, low overcast cloud condi- 
tions were observed over the ocean, based on satel- 
lite information. As the cold arctic air passed over 
the relatively warm waters offshore, an extensive 
area of stratocumulus clouds developed. Past ex- 
perience has shown that this type of cloud for- 
mation has bases between 1,000 feet and 2,000 
feet. Satellite pictures show the tops of this ex- 
tensive overcast region to be approximately 4,000 
feet. The area of cloud coverage extended from 
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just off Cape Cod to the eastward and from south- 
western Nova Scotia southward to approximately 
35 degrees north latitude. 
Offshore surface visibilities between Cape Cod and 
the crash site are estimated to have been approxi- 
mately 6 NM, with isolated areas having less than 
1 NM in snow showers and snow squalls. Chatham 
(MA) radar reported a rather large area of radar 
echoes resulting from snow shower activity. A ship 
located at  44-20N/66-30W reported visibility at 1- 
114 NM in moderate snow with low overcast con- 
dit ions .” 
As a matter of interest, this synopsis was corrob- 
orated time and again by witnesses who appeared 
before the board. The master of the Kaisei Maru 
18 gave the following account: 
The helicopter arrived in the vicinity at 0945 GMT, 
but actually proceeded to the location of a similar 
vessel approximately six miles away. (The master 
assumed this because he identified the helicopter 
as a fast-moving target on his surface radar). The 
wind was from the northwest at 20 knots and the 
seas from the same direction at 2.0 to 2.5 meters in 
height. The visibility varied in heavy snow show- 
ers, but the master knew that it was frequently 
at least two nautical miles, because later he could 
see the other fishing boat (to which the helicopter 
had originally flown) and confirmed its range on 
radar. The snow was of powdery consistency. Vis- 
ibility was restricted by fog forming just above the 
sea surface. Free air temperature was measured at 
minus two degrees Celsius, and sea water surface 
temperature at  13.2 degrees Celsius. The barom- 
eter read 1040.5 millibars. 
Of particular interest to the board was the pilot’s 
decision to fill all of the helicopter’s fuel tanks 
to the maximum before departing on the mission. 
With the design of the helicopter’s fuel system in 
mind, a full fuel load would, under any set of en- 
vironmental conditions, result in the aircraft be- 
ing above the maximum certificated takeoff gross 
weight. Since the helicopter had been fueled from 
a JP-4 truck which had gradually “cold-soaked” 
to the minus fifteen degrees Celsius temperature 
which existed on Cape Cod, the aircraft was a 
whopping 1200 pounds heavier than permitted at 
takeoff. Although not a cause factor in the ac- 
cident, this “additional finding” highlighted the 
importance this pilot attached to fuel sufficiency 
when contemplating a long offshore mission, par- 
ticularly one which featured uncertainty of the ves- 
sel’s position and a headwind component on the 
return leg. 
When a few of my fellow pilots learned that I 
would be attending your workshop, they said, “Hey, 
tell them we need more information on the weather 
features between the sea surface and, let’s say, 
2,000 feet.” The truth is, most Coast Guard pi- 
lots have a pretty good mental picture of what 
to expect at  the interface between either the sea 
or land, given a certain set of parameters. What 
is needed is a graphic portrayal of these condi- 
tions for decision-makers who employ aviation re- 
sources. Why should the pilot be forced to “poke 
his nose in it”, instead? 
As stated in the book Weather Flving, weather is 
a local phenomenon. Local knowledge and expe- 
rience should be combined with a detailed fore- 
cast to produce a better mental “picture” of the 
weather. The intent is not for the pilot or dis- 
patcher to exploit advantages resulting from im- 
proved weather sense; on the contrary, a conserva- 
tive decision can be formulated around this wari- 
ness. I remember years ago ferrying helicopters 
across west Texas on the “southern ferry route”. 
Approximately 150 miles east of El Paso, com- 
manding a view of the southernmost portion of 
the continental divide, is Guadelupe Pass. Even 
though I had never experienced turbulence in a 
helicopter, the “old hands” cautioned us never to 
cross Guadelupe if the winds at the RCO were 
indicating higher than 15 knots. It seemed like 
reasonable advice, possibly written in blood, and 
I would observe it today without question. 
We should do away with “special VFR” for all ex- 
cept aircraft involved in emergency missions. I’m 
sorry, ladies and gentlemen, but if you don’t have 
an instrument ticket, you shouldn’t be out there 
flailing around in IMC. Yes, to avoid inconvenience, 
a great number of precision approach aids will 
have to be established at small airports around 
the country. And too, positive control will have 
to be exercised, if not through additional control 
towers, then at least remotely. All of this will tax 
the air traffic control system, but when the ceil- 
ings come down and visibility shrinks, we can’t se- 
riously be expected to “see and avoid” each other 
(and ground obstacles) while squeezed below 1,200 
feet AGL. 
Circling approaches are a sucker play, particularly 
in approach category C, D, and E aircraft. Have 
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you ever tried to maintain circling altitude and 
airspeed while fighting the effects of vertigo, tur- 
bulence, precipitation, and the like without ex- 
ceeding 30 degrees angle of bank? Have you re- 
ally managed to keep the runway environment in 
sight? Can you really expect the bottom of an 
overcast to be perfectly constant in altitude? 
- All operations should cease at an airport which is 
experiencing low-level wind shear. I learned my 
lesson over the Gulf of Alaska while penetrating 
“roll clouds” near the base of an imbedded thun- 
derstorm at 500 feet. Fortunately, the aircraft en- 
countered a severe updraft resulting in a climb of 
2,000 feet per minute with collective pitch at a 
minimum. The aircraft yawed 180 degrees to the 
right with full left pedal applied. My first Op- 
erations Officer, CDR Frank Silvia, was lost on 
Eastern Airlines Flight 66 when it encountered 
LLWS years ago in the first commercial accident 
attributable to this phenomenon. Let’s recognize 
it. 
Pilots will never probably fully appreciate the forces 
of nature or the potential for destruction. Indeed, 
in this computer age of digital electronics, there 
appears to be a greater impatience with weather 
than ever before. Pilots want to graph it, map it, 
electronically disect it, display it in pulsating col- 
ors, and then top it. They surely don’t want to be 
inconvenienced by it. 
I recall launching out of Cape Cod to search for 
a man overboard near Boston during one of the 
worst summer squall lines to traverse the New 
England coast in years. After level-off at 1,000 feet 
over Cape Cod Bay, we were surrounded by light- 
ning in all quadrants. The radar was totally use- 
less, since the intensity of nearby cells effectively 
attenuated radar signals at a greater range. The 
best we could do was hang on. At one point, my 
radioman asked me what would happen if light- 
ning struck the helicopter. I remembered hearing 
about a Kaman HH-43 helicopter which disinte- 
grated after a lightning strike near MacDill AFB 
many years ago. I recalled also sitting through a 
training session where an older, more experienced, 
pilot described a helicopter struck by lightning as 
a giant arc welder. The point is, I still have abso- 
lutely no idea what hiippens when a helicopter is 
struck by lightning, but the thought is very unset- 
tling. I give thunderstorms a wide berth for that, 
and many other, reasons. I told the radioman our 
static discharge wicks on the horizontal stabilizer 
could handle it. Thank you. 
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